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DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE BY PUBLIC
UTILITIES
By FORD P HALL*
I INTRODUCTION"
T HE question of discontinuance of service by utilities is one of
vital inportance to the public. To deprive the public of means
of transportation, telephone communication or electric power is
indeed serious. For certain utilities, namely, common carriers,
the question has taken on added significance in the past few years.
Due to the rapid increase in motor bus transportation, they have
found it desirable, and in some instances necessary, to curtail or
to discontinue all or parts of their service. Naturally the question
as to their rights and duties under such circumstances has pre-
sented itself.
2
It is essential to bear in mind that there are various grades
of regulation which a state may constitutionally exercise over pub-
lic callings. All are manifestations of the police power. Even
over strictly private enterprises the state enjoys some regulatory
control. It may pass measures improving conditions of health,
sanitation or safety for employees. In certain callings affected
with a public interest, the state may regulate rates. In others it
may make regulations concermng wages or service. Finally, there
are those enterprises over which the state may exercise the great-
est measure of control. Here under certain circumstances it may
force a utility to continue operation although the company may
have indicated its desire to withdraw 3 In some states this power
is looked upon as one aspect of the state's control over service.'
*Assocate Professor, Department of Political Science, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana.
'It is not intended in this article to deal with abandonment by
interstate carriers. For a discussion of this subject see the article by
0. P Field, "The Abandonment Sections of the Transportation Act
of 1920," 2 Ind. L. ,J. 445.2See the discussion of the court on this problem in Board of County
Commissioners v. Public Utilities Commission, (1923) 107 Oh. St. 442,
140 N. E. 87 See also the article dealing with the effect of motor bus
competition upon railways and abandonment, by Geo. V Anderson,
Atlantic Monthly, March 1925, p. 393.
3See the discussion of the court in Wolff Packing Company v.
Court of Industrial Relations, (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630,
67 L. Ed. 1103.4Louisiana, Kansas, Colorado and Utah among others. See Brooks
Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1919) 144 La. 1086, 81 So.
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In others a distinction is made between the regulation of service
and the regulation of withdrawal.5 If it is an aspect of service
regulation, it is clear that it is its most extreme form.0
II SOURCES OF THE OBLIGATION TO CONTINUE SERVICE
(a) Sources from which the obligation does not arise.-
It is now generally conceded that there is not an unlimited right
on the part of a public enterprise to withdraw " It becomes nec-
essary first to determine the sources of this obligation to continue
operation.
727; People v. Colorado Title and Trust Co., (1919) 65 Colo. 472, 178
Pac. 6; State v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (1915) 96 Kan. 298, 150
Pac. 544; Re Emigration Canyon Ry., (1917) P U. R. 1917F 464.5 Georgia Ry. Com. v. Macon Ry. and Light Co., (1921) 151 Ga.
256, 106 S. E. 282; Petition of the Boston and Maine Ry., (1925) 82
N. H. 116, 129 Ad. 880.6The question is not entirely an academic one. The attitude which
a court takes may be important in determining whether a commission
has jurisdiction to pass on questions of abandonment. See Part V7 Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S.
396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; Gates v. Boston and N. Y Airline
Co., (1885) 53 Conn. 333; State ex rel. Little v. Dodge City M. and
T Ry., (1894) 53 Kan. 329, 36 Pac. 755; State ex rel. Naylor v. Dodge
City Co., (1894) 53 Kan. 377, 36 Pac. 747; State ex rel. Grmsfelder v.
Spokane Street Ry., (1898) 19 Wash. 518, 53 Pac. 719; Day v. Tacoma
Ry. and Power Co., (1914) 80 Wash. 161, 141 Pac. 347; Southern Ry. v.
Hatchett, (1917) 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W 694.
There is, however, plenty of respectable authority stating that a
public utility may withdraw at its own discretion. See, for example,
Jack v. Williams, (C.C.S.D. 1902) 113 Fed. 823; People v. Albany and
Vt. Ry., (1861) 37 Barb. (N.Y.) 216 San Antonio Street Ry. v. State,
(1897) 90 Tex. 520, 39 S. W 926; Coe v. Columbus, P &. I. R. R.,
(1859) 10 Ohio St. 372; 1 Wyman, Public Service Corporations, sec.
296. "But even in the case of a railroad company which has accepted
extraordinary privileges, it would seem that, if it is ready to give tip
its charter, it may withdraw from its entire undertaking."
However, most of the above cases turned upon special circum-
stances and when properly understood can be harmoliized with the
general rule. In Jack v. Williams the road was in hopeless financial
condition. The action was for mandamus to compel relaying the tracks.
The court seems to have ignored the question of obligation and to
have been impressed with the futility of attempting to order the mi-
possible. In Coe v. Columbus, the court appears to have been dominat-
ed with the same idea when it said: "If a railroad can be operated profit-
ably. the interest of those concerned will rarely if ever fail to keep
it in operation so as to subserve the public use. If it cannot, we know
of no mode by which the state can compel those by whom it was con-
structed to operate it at a loss " These are not authorities for
holding that a company has an unlimited right of withdrawal although
often cited for that proposition. They merely fall in line with those
cases holding that where a company is losing money on its entire
enterprise it will not be compelled to continue.
The case of San Antonio Street Ry. Co. seems to stand out, how-
ever, as a direct authority against the general rule.
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The mere fact that a person engages in a business affected
with a public interest does not of itself cast upon him an obli-
gation from any source to continue service, although the language
of certain courts might indicate this. Such a point of view fails
to recognize that there are various kinds of callings affected with
a public interest and that there are different grades of regulation
which a state may constitutionally exercise over each. The courts
in at least two famous decisions have stated that not all persons
engaged in public callings can be compelled to continue operation.
In Mum v. Illinois it was declared
"Property does become clothed with a public interest
when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and af-
fect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant
by discontminig the use, but, so long as he maintains the use,
he must submit to the control."8
In WVolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, a
three-fold classification was made of public enterprises, (a) those
carried on under a grant of privilege, (b) certain occupations re-
garded as exceptional, such as the keeping of inns, cabs and
gristmills, etc., (c) businesses the owner of which had devoted
them to a public use. The court then stated
"The power of a legislature to compel continuity in a busi-
ness can only arise where the obligation of continued service by
the owner and its employees is direct and is assumed when the
business is entered upon. A common carrier which accepts a
railroad franchise is not free to withdraw the use of that which
it has granted to the public. It is true that if operation is impos-
sible without continuous loss, it may give up its franchise and
enterprise but short of this it must continue. Not so the owner
when by mere changed conditions his business becomes clothed
with a public interest. He may stop at will whether the business
be losing or profitable."O
In certain cases the obligation has been founded upon the
extremely broad ground of a trust in favor of the public.O If
8(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77
9(1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
lOSee the discussion of the court in People Y. N. Y C. and H.
R. R. Co., (1883) 28 Hun (N.Y.) 543; Wright v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry.
and Light Co., (1897) 95 Wis. 29, 69 N. W 791. Here the court stated,
"By the acceptance of the terms of the ordinance the railroad coin-
pany assumed a public trust."
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the relationship between the state and such enterprises is one of
trust, then there are few limits to the extent of the state's con-
trol. Such a theory has little support in the cases, however
It has sometimes been asserted that the obligation to continue
service arises from common law However, the general rule
seems to be that at common law apart from contract or grant of
special privilege, there is no such obligation upon the operator of
a public enterprise. Some early cases have indicated this. An
innkeeper was allowed to withdraw, 1 a ferryman was permitted
to discontinue,' 2 and a teamster was allowed to abandon his
calling.1
3
Certain modern cases have affirmed the rule. In Lucking v.
The Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., a common carrier by
water was held under no obligation to continue, and in so deciding
the court stated
"No authority has been called to my attention and I have
discovered none, to the effect that a common carrier, such as the
defendant here, not enjoying any public franchise or exercising
any public powers or privileges, is bound, after commencing to
operate vessels over a certain route, to continue such operation,
it it finds it desirable to discontinue or abandon the same."' 4
Again in San Antomo Street Ry. Co. v Texas, the court
declared
"We would not be understood as holding, that the common
law does not impose some duties upon companies chartered as
common carriers, which may be enforced by mandamus, although
no mention of such duties be found in their charters. All car-
riers who undertake to transport goods or passengers for the pub-
lic assume certain duties to the public, but certainly carriers who
"Rex v. Collins, (.623) Palmer 373. "An innkeeper may at his
pleasure demolish his sign and leave off innkeeping."
'
2Carter v. Commonwealth, (1823) 2 Va. 354. Here the plaintiff
discontinued his ferry and was indicted for failing to keep sufficient
boats to carry traffic. The statute under which he was indicted pro-
vided that all ferries not used should be discontinued. Held that lie
was not guilty Discontinuance was the penalty attached to failure
to use the privilege. No law made discontinuance an offense, much
less an indictable offense.
"3Satterlee v. Groad, (1828) 1 Wend. (N.Y.) 272. The question of
discontinuance arose only incidentally A common carrier by wagon
had withdrawn from service. At a later time goods were hauled for
one D. The question arose as to whether the carrier was liable as a
common carrier, or as a private carrier. The court determined that the
liability was that of a private carrier.
'
4(D.C.Mich. 1921) 273 Fed. 577 See also the same case (1924)
265 U. S. 346, 44 Sun. Ct. 504, 68 L. Ed. 1047, where the decision of
the lower court was upheld.
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are not corporations may at any time discontinue the business, if
they elect to do so "15
It does not matter what may be the reason for such with-
drawal, whether it be because operation has been carried on at
a loss, or whether for other reasons. However, even at common
law it is necessary to comply with certain prerequisites before
withdrawal. There is an obligation to give notice to the public
of abandonment. The duty here is to give such notice as will
enable the public to make a proper adjustment. The utility is
required also to withdraw in a reasonable manner. What is a
reasonable manner is a question of fact and must be determined
m each case by the surrounding circumstances. 0
Likewise, there is no obligation at common law, apart from
contract, to continue private spur tracks and switches."
The commission has declared, however, that in the state of
Wisconsin there is an obligation from this source to continue
service."' "It is a cardinal rule at common law, at least in Wis-
consin, that a public function cannot be abandoned without the
consent of the state." The commission cites three cases as au-
thority for this proposition but they are not convincing. 0
(b) The obligation may arise from contract.--A public util-
ity may be compelled as the result of some contractual obligation
to continue service. Such contracts may be contracts with the
state itself, contracts with a subdivision of the state, such as a
municipality or county, or contracts with a private person. The
contracts may be express or implied.
The mere charter of incorporation, although a contract with
the state,20 does not of itself cast upon any company an obliga-
15(1897) 90 Tex. 520, 39 S. W 926.
'GSee 1 Wyman, Public Utilities, sec. 316 and 317
17Durden et al. v. So. Ry., (1907) 2 Ga. App. 66, 58 S. E. 299.
in the absence of charter requirements, statutory regulation,
or special contract to the contrary, there is no inhibition against a
carrier using its discretion in abandoning the stations at which it has
been accustomed to receive freight." Jones v. Newport News and
M. V Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 65 Fed. 736.
18Re Eastern Wisconsin Electric Co., (1918) P U. R. 191SE 748
(Wis.)
29Att'y Gen. v. West Wis. Ry., (1874) 36 Wis. 467- Wright v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. and Light Co., (1897) 95 Wis. 29, 69 N. W 791,
State v. Frost, (1902) 113 Wis. 623, 89 N. W 915. In each of these
decisions which the commission cited, there were franchises and
special privileges granted by the state. The obligation to continue serv-
ice arose from these sources rather than from common law. The
common law obligations as to withdrawal were not mentioned by the
courts in any of these cases.
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tion to continue service.21 This is evident from those cases in
which a corporation has engaged in a business affected with a
public interest and yet it has been declared that it is under no
duty to continue.2 2 It appears also from the cases in which cor-
porations, although engaged in a public service, but doing so with-
out special privilege, have been allowed to withdraw 2 Where
there was no contract between a company and a municipality, it
was decided that the articles of incorporation imposed no obliga-
tion to continue. 2
4
There may be an obligation to continue service arising either
from a franchise to engage in a particular business or from a
franchise to use the streets and highways. If either of these in-
struments contains ex press terms requiring continued operation,
then there is an express contract and the franchise will be re-
garded as mandatory 25 If there are no express contracts, and
20Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 519,
4 L. Ed. 629; State of Texas v. Enid 0. and W Ry., (1917) 108 Tex.
239, 191 S. W 560. "The charter, when so issued and accepted, con-
stituted a contract between the state and the railway company, and
like other contracts its provisions and covenants are binding upon
such party thereto. "
21Montell v. Consolidation Coal Co., (1876) 45 Md. 16; Pacific
Spruce Co. v. McCoy, (D.C. Or. 1923) 294 Fed. 711, St. Clairsville
v. Public Utility Commission, (1921) 102 Ohio St. 574, 132 N. E. 1511L
See Conklin v. Prospect Park Hotel Co., (1888) 48 Hun (N.Y.) 619,
1 N. Y S. 406. "Indeed we are by no means certain that the charter
imposes any duty on the defendant of carrying on the hotel."
22Lucking v. Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., (D.C. Mich.
1921) 273 Fed. 577 (1924) 265 U. S. 346, 44 Sup. Ct. 504, 68 L. Ed. 1047
See the statement of the court in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of In-
dustrial Relations, (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 756.23Montell v. Consolidation Coal Co., (1876) 45 Md. 16. Here it was
held that a company with a charter granted for the purpose of manu-
facturing iron and mining coal and Nith the right to build a railroad
and carry its own products and reserving to citizens the right to
transport products over the road when built, had the right to withdraw
such road at its own election and the charter imposed no obligation
to continue. Pacific Spruce Co. v. McCoy, (D.C.Or. 1923) 294 Fed.
711. Here was a private carrier operated by a lumber company Upon
petition of certain citizens it had been temporarily operated for the
public. It was decided that it was under no obligation to continue.
245t. Clairsville v. Public Utility Commission, (1921) 102 Ohio St.
574, 132 N. E. 151.2 5It should be noted that there are here three kinds or grades of
mandatory franchises. The first would compel operation of an entire
system which a company might be desirous of discontinuing, even
where such continuance might entail a loss. The second would compel
a company to operate a part or branch of a system which it might
wish to abandon. The third would compel continuance of a particular
service which the company might desire to curtail. A franchise might
be mandatory so as to compel a certain service while the company
continued its operation of a branch. Or a franchise might be manda-
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if there are no implied contracts requiring continuance, there is
no duty to continue operation.26 To determine the express terms
which make a franchlse mandatory presents an extremely dif-
ficult question and the courts are not entirely in accord in an-
swenng it.
A franchise may in express terms permit withdrawal. How-
ever, such a francluse allowing a company to discontinue a branch
was held not to entitle it to abandon any part of such branch."
Terms in a franclse wluch merely give permission to operate or
to use for a certain number of years do not make the franchise
mandatory 211 A franchise may specifically state that a corpora-
tion shall continue service during a period of time.2-' In fact,
it is safe to assert that only such a franchise would compel opera-
tion of a whole enterprise at a loss. This is talked of as a possi-
bility,"0 but thus far no such franchise has been litigated before
tory so that it would require the continuance of a part of the system
and still not compel operation of the whole.2OLucking v. Det. and Clev. Nay. Co., (1924) 265 U. S. 346, 44
Sup. Ct. 504, 68 L. Ed. 1047.
2i.City of Helena v. Helena Light and Rail Co., (1922) 63 Mont.
108, 207 Pac. 337 Here- a provision was found in the charter that the
grantee should not be compelled to operate any or all of its system
at a loss. Held to authorize abandonment of one whole branch, not a
part of one.28Gress v. Village of Fort Laramie, (1919) 100 Oh. St. 35, 125 N.
E. 112. In this case the company had a franchise to operate for
twenty-five years, yet was allowed to discontinue. State of Tex. v. E.
Texas Ry. Co., (D.C.Tex. 1922) 283 Fed. 584. Here was a franchise
to construct and operate a railroad for a period of twenty-five years.
Held not mandatory so as to compel operation at a loss. Gasser v.
Garden Bay Ry., (1919) 205 Mich. 5, 171 N. W 791.2 9City of Salina v. Salina Street Ry. Co., (1923) 114 Kan. 734,
220 Pac. 203. The provision which was interpreted as requiring opera-
tion here stated, "That said A shall begin actual work within the
corporate limits on said street railway within ninety days from the
adoption of this ordinance, and shall have not less than one mile con-
structed in six months, and cars running on not less than four miles
within twelve months from the adoption of this ordinance, and
shall continuously operate said line during the life of this franchise."
City of Jamestown v. Penn. Gas Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1924) 1 F (2d)
871. The franchise provided that the company was to furnish gas and
the supply was to continue "so long as said company shall continue
to bring natural gas to said village, not exceeding, however, the limit
of its corporate existence, as fixed by its certificate of incorporation."
3 0See Re Fairview Transportation Co. P U. R. 1917E. 44 (Ill.).
The commission was asked to approve a lease. The question of the duty
of the company to continue operation under its charter was commented
upon. "In the absence of an express contract embraced in a charter,
the owner of a railway cannot be compelled to maintain and operate
the same at a loss Obviously there is an express contract embodied
in the petitioner's charter, and this contractual obligation is enforce-
able without regard to loss sustained or gain enjoyed by the pe-
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the courts. A franchise which provided among other things that
a railway and light company should in the operation of its sys-
tem maintain a schedule of not more than thirty minutes between
cars, was held to be mandatory so as to compel the operation of
a branch line the company was endeavoring to discontinue 1 Simi-
larly a street railway company was held bound to operate a branch
line, under a franchise which contained a provision requiring that
a car should pass any given point each way on the route every
twenty minutes for twelve hours, and at least once every thirty
minutes for four hours during that part of the day that the road
should be operated.3 2 If, then, a franchise contains a provision
requiring the operation of a certain number of trains, these two
cases indicate that it will be deemed mandatory so as to compel
operation of every branch.
There are certain special privileges which the state or city
may grant that give rise to implied obligations on the part of
utilities to continue service."
"An express contract is not essential to establish reciprocal
rights between a public service company and the public it under-
takes to serve. Such rights arise by implication of law ,,14
These special privileges are of various kinds. One of the
most important is the power of eminent domain. In the case of
State v. Bullock the court stated
"By the acceptance of its charter from the state, such a
company is permitted to exercise certain rights not enjoyed by
titioner." Potter Transportation Co. v. Warren County, (1919) 182
Ky. 840, 207 S. W 709. In this case the court stated, "We do not mean
to say that where there is a contractual obligation to operate the road
for a specified time it might abandon it if operating at a loss. It seems
to us there is no reason why a contract should not be enforced in this
class of cases with the same rigour and fullne~s as in others. Where
contract obligations are assumed, the rights of the parties are deter-
mined by the terms of the contract and not by profit or loss."31Macon Railway and Light Co. v. Corbin, (1923) 155 Ga. 1, 116
S. E. 305.32City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry., (1893) 51 Kan. 609, 33
Pac. 309.33State v. Bullock, (1919) 78 Fla. 321, 82 So. 866; Brooks Scanlon
Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183,
64 L. Ed. 323; Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River Ry., (1897) 70 Minn.
105, 72 N. W 835.3 4 City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas and Electric Power Co.,(1913) 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919; but see State v. Central Ia. Ry., (1887)
71 Ia. 410, 32 N. W 409. "It may be admitted that no contract existsbetween the people and the railroad; but when taxes are voted, collected
and paid to the company, and it has availed itself of public aid from
taxation, it assumes a relation to the public of a higher and more
sacred character than contracts between mere private individuals."
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individuals. It is given certain of the attributes of sovereignty
itself such as the power of ermnent domain. Accordingly,
therefore, the public has such an interest in the operation of such
a road that, when once undertaken, it may not be discontinued by
a proceeding in which the state is not represented.""5
Again in Kansas v. Dodge City Ry. Co. in discussing aban-
donment the court declared
"The right to exercise the very high attributes of sovereignty,
the power of eminent domain, and of taxation to further the con-
struction of railways could not be granted to aid purely private
enterprises." 3
Another kind of special privilege is monopoly In dealing
with monopoly and the problem of abandonment one court said
"A distinction should be made between service obligations
of a company holding a local monopolistic franchise and the ob-
ligations of one which, as a matter of public policy, is expected
to meet unlimted competition. 3T
The right to use the highways appears to be another such
privilege, at least where the use is different from that accorded
to the average private citizen.38 The privilege of erecting poles
and wires would be an example of such special use.30
Grants of land, and grants of money by means of taxation,
give rise to implied obligations on the part of utilities to continue
operation."
"Another proposition well supported in the decisions is that
where public aid has been given through taxes and grants of labor
and material, so long as they are retained by the company, the
said company is under obligations to operate its property "4i
The reason for the rule has been well stated by one court.
"It would be at war with every principle of natural justice
to hold that it [the railway company] might avail itself of this
public aid, and then violate its obligations to the public incurred
by reason of aid thus received."' 2
35State v. Bullock, (1919) 78 Fla. 321, 82 So. 866; see also Gates
v. Boston and N. Y. Air Line, (1885) 53 Conn. 333.36Kansas v. Dodge City, M. and T. Ry., (1894) 53 Kan. 377, 36
Pac. 747.3 7 City of Salina v. Salina Street Ry., (1923) 114 Kan. 734, 220
Pac. 203.38 City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas and Electric Power Co.,
(1913) 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919.
39See footnote 38.
4°Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River Ry., (1897) 70 Minn. 105,
72 N. W 835; Smith v. Atlantic So. Ry., (1915) P. U. R. 1915F 125
(Iowa).
41Smith v. Atlantic S. Ry., (1915) P. U. R. 191SF 125 (Iowa).
421owa v. Central Ia. Ry., (1887) 71 Ia. 410, 32 N. W 409.
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The form in which the special privilege is accorded to the
company is immaterial. It may be embodied in the charter it-
self.43  It may take the form of a special and separate grant."
Or it may be allowed to the company by statute.
Certain cases deny that there is an obligation on the part
of the public utilities to continue operation unless there are ex-
press contracts requiring continuance. The courts of Ohio in
two cases have refused to recognize the existence of any implied
obligations whatsoever and permitted withdrawal where no stat-
utes or express contracts compelled continued operation."
In addition to contracts which a utility may have with the
state it may also have contracts with subdivisions of the state.
Such contracts usually take the form of franchises. The ordi-
nance is passed and it is accepted by the company This consti-
tutes a contract between the city and the utility 48 "A grant of
a franchise and its acceptance constitute a contract.'
7
If there is no contractual relationship between the city and
the utility and no statute pertaining to abandonment then there is
no obligation which the city may enforce in its own right to con-
tinue operation. There is no right to enforce against third par-
ties, with whom there is no privity of contract, a duty to con-
tinue.4s  In St. Clairsuille v. Public Utility Commission, a gas
43 Lusby v. Kansas City M. and B. R. Co., (1896) 73 Miss. 360, 19
So. 339.
44Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River Ry. Co., (1897) 70 Minn.
105, 72 N. W 835.
4SE. Ohio Gas. Co. v. City of Akron, (1909) 81 Ohio St. 33, 90 N.
E. 40; E. Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland, (1922) 106 Ohio St.
489, 140 N. W 410.
'
8 Laighton v. City of Carthage, (C.C.Mo. 1909) 175 Fed. 145. The
court stated here that the relationship between the city and the com-
pany was contractual. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron, (1909) 81 Ohio
33, 90 N. E. 40. "Whatever rights the city may have to maintain this
action, they must arise out of its contract with the Gas Corn-
pany" for that the ordinance passed and its acceptance by the
company constituted a contract." City of Spartenburg v. S. C. Gas
and Electric Co., (1924) 130 S. C. 125, 125 S. E. 295. The ordinance
constituted a binding contract between the city and the street rail-
way company. City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry., (1893) 51 Kan.
609, 33 Pac. 309 Union Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Ry. Coin.,
(D.C.Ky. 1926) 17 F (2d) 143.
47 City of Helena v. Helena Light and Ry., (1922) 63 Mont. 108,
207 Pac. 337
48(1921) 102 Ohio St. 574, 132 N. E. 151, Contra if the duty is
statutory. Cambria Steel Co. v. Johnstown Fuel Supply Co. (1921)
P U. R. 1921E 454 (Pa.) "The jurisdiction of the commission was
created by statute creating and vesting in it authority to regulate the
public service in which the Peoples Co. is engaged, and the company
having undertaken through the Johnstown Fuel Supply Co. to supply
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company held a franchise from the village of St. Clairsville. A
second company supplied the first with gas, but had no franchise
and no contract with the village. The court refused to enjoin
the second company from discontinuing service, on the ground
that there was no contract relationship between said company and
the village, and hence there was no duty to continue. 9 Another
example of the same principle appears where a utility has held
a franchise but this franchise has expired. A water company had
had a franchise to operate its plant and render service to the pub-
lic of a municipality Its franchise expired. It was decided that
the company's right to operate the plant had ceased and with it
the right of the city to demand service. After the expiration of
the francluse each was free to go its own way 50 Again, the fran-
chise of a company furnishing gas had expired. The state com-
mission directed the plaintiff to continue to furnish service. The
court held that the order was beyond the power of the commis-
sion, and the company was under no obligation to continuesi
A utility may be bound to continue operation by reason of a
contract with some private person.52 Lands had been conveyed
to a railway company The consideration was the erection and
the location of a depot in the southern part of a particular city
The depot was removed. It was held 'that an action would be
maintained against the company for the value of the land.53 Again,
natural gas in the city of Johnstown, that service ipso facto
came under the regulatory authority of this commission, and can-
not be abandoned in the manner attempted."
49 See footnote 48.50Laighton v. City of Carthage, (C.C.Mo. 1909) 175 Fed. 145.5
'Union Light, Heat and Power Co., (D.C.Ky. 1926) 17 F (2d)
143. "The franchise involved in this case, by its express terms ran
for a period of ten years. Therefore under section 163 and 164
of the constitution of Kentucky the plaintiff had no right under
that franchise to occupy the streets and the public ways of the City
of Ft. Thomas after the 5th day of September, 1925, and the city was
without power to confer upon it any such right, except in the same
way as the original franchise was granted. " "Therefor, looking
alone to the two state constitutional provisions it seems perfectly
obvious that all obligation on the part of the plaintiff to furnish gas
service to the citizens of Ft. Thomas terminated on the expiration of
its franchise " See also the report of the decision on the same
case in the state court, Union Light, Heat and Power Co. v. City of
Ft. Thomas, (1926) 215 Ky. 384, 285 S. W 228.5 21t is not intended in this article to deal at length with private
contracts, as they do not fall properly within the scope of this dis-
sertation. One of the most important kinds of private contracts per-
tains to spur tracks. This subject is dealt with in Part IV5 3International and G. N. Ry. v. Sallie Dawson, (1884) 62 Tex.
260.
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where certain lands were conveyed and the railway company
agreed in another instrument, which was part of the original con-
sideration, to maintain a side track and station on the lands, it
was stated that the agreement was binding on the company un-
less public necessity required a discontinuance. 54  A covenant
to erect a depot and to stop all trains in consideration for a con-
veyance of land is not against public policy ' However, such
private agreements are made subject to public welfare and if for
some reason it becomes necessary for the welfare of the public to
break such contracts, the utility is no longer bound.50 The mere
building along the line of a railway or utility does not constitute
a contract between the utility and such individuals and gives them
no cause of action on behalf of themselves against the company
as a result of discontinuance, even though such action greatly
decreases the value of their property " Such a doctrine once ad-
mitted would destroy the general convenience of a public utility
It would then become hampered and subject to the control of an
individual and would be made to subserve such interest to the
detriment of the public welfare. 58
(c) The obligation may arise from statute.-The duty
which a public utility may be under to continue service may arise
not only from contract, but also from statute. In fact, the latter
source of obligation has become more important in recent years
than the former. Of course, there may be a duty to continue
arising from both contract and statute.
Most states now have certain acts governing abandonment.
In some places there are express laws. Nevada, Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, California, Arkansas, Connecticut, New Mexico, Iowa
Texas, New York, New Hampshire, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota,
Vermont, Tennessee, and Alabama, have statutes expressly gov-
erning discontinuance by certain utilities.55 In other states, there
54Louisville and Nashville Ry. v. Johnson's Administratrix, (1925)
207 Ky. 813, 270 S. W 50.85Gray v. Chic. M. and St. P Ry., (1901) 189 Il. 400, 59 N. E. 950.58L. and N. Ry. v. Johnson s Administratrix, (1925) 207 Ky. 813,
270 S. W 58.57Day v. Tacoma Ry. and Power Co., (1914) 80 Wash. 161, 141
Pac. 347 Asher v. Hutchinson Light and Power Co., (1903) 66 Kan.
496, 71 Pac. 813.58Asher v. Hutchinson Light and Power Co., (1903) 66 Kan.
496, 71 Pac. 813.
-
5 Alabama: Gen. Acts 1927, p. 319, sec. 27, also Gen. Acts 1920 p.
92, sec. 10 and sec 51.
Arkansas: Acts 1919, p. 411, sec. 10.
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is implied from certain statutes requiring reasonable service, an
obligation to continiae operation.6"
Such statutes governing abandonment may be part of the
charter or franchise contract, if the charter or franchise is granted
after the passage of the statute.61 But if the statute is passed
subsequently to the formation of the contract beween state and
utility, whether it is then part of the charter contract presents a
difficult problem. One Ohio case62 held that the section of the
California: Civil Code 1923, sec. 468 (Statutes 1923, p. 443, sec.
1, amending sec. 468 of the Civil Code.)
Connecticut: Rev. St. 1918, chap. 191, sec. 3635.
Iowa: Code, sec. 2092-2095 (Iowa, Comp. Laws 1927, sec. 8162-
8165).
Maryland: Acts 1914, chap. 445, p. 719, secs. 26% and 33%.
Michigan: Acts 1887, act 275, p. 373, amended 1891, act 125, p. 147
sec. 1 and 2 (Comp. St. 1915, see. 8363-8364).
Minnesota: G. S. 1923, secs. 4926-4930.
Mississippi: Laws 1926, chap. 128, sec. 5.
Nevada: Statutes 1919, chap. 109, p. 198, sec. 36%.
New Hampshire: Laws 1917, chap. 82, sec. 2.
New Mexico: Laws 1921, chap. 200, sec. 1.
New York: New York Railroad Law, sec. 184.
Olo: General Code of Ohio, sec. 504-2 and 504-3.
Tennessee: Pub. Acts 1927, chap. 64, p. 209.
Texas: Acts 1918, 4th C. S. chap. 27, see. 1 and 2 (Revised Civil
Statutes 1925, art. 6349 and 6350.)
Vermont: Public Acts 1925, no. 91, p. 131.60Kansas: Laws 1911, chap. 238, sec. 10 (Comp. St. 1915, sec. 8337).
"Every common carrier and public utility governed by the provisions
of this act shall be required to furnish reasonably efficient and suffi-
cient service " State v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co., (1915) 96 Kan.
298, 150 Pac. 544. In states having no express statutes governing
abandonment, the duty to continue operation would have to be
implied from statutes similar to the Kansas Statute. See for example
the statutes of the states listed below.
Maine: Rev. St. 1916, chap. 55, sec. 16.
Missouri: Laws 1913, p. 570 (Rev. St. 1919, sec. 10436).
Indiana: Acts 1913, p. 167 (Burns Ann. St. 1926, see. 12678).
Utah: Laws Utah 1917, chap. 47, art 3, sec. 1.
Colorado: Laws 1913, chap. 127, sec. 13, b.61State of Texas v. Enid 0. & Western Ry., (1917) 108 Tex. 239,
191 S. W 560. A charter of railway constitutes a contract with the
state, and is granted on the implied understanding by the company
that it construct and operate a railway between limits specified and
under express statutory enactment constituting part of its contract,
and that it will not abandon or remove any part of the main line once
constructed.62East Ohio Gas Co. v. Cleveland, (1922) 106 Oh. St. 489, 140
N. E. 410. "The parties hereto having entered into a contractual re-
lation, the terms of which construed in the light of decisions of this
court entitled either to terminate the contract at will, such application
of sections 504-2 and 504-3, General Code, would impair the obliga-
tions of those contracts, in that it would impose in Public Utilities
Comnssion the power to require the East Ohio Gas Company to con-
tinue its service in the city of Cleveland after it had elected to ter-
minate the contracts, in violation of the terms of the contracts as in-
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statute 3 attempting to make the law applicable to contracts en-
tered into prior to its passage was invalid as violating the contract
clause of the federal constitution.14  In that decision, the commis-
sion was attempting to force a utility to continue service, where
it had discontinued without the commission's consent. A later
decision in the same state upheld an order of the commission
against the protest of a municipality, permitting the utility to dis-
continue under the statute passed after the franchise had been
granted. The validity of the clause was upheld. It was stated
that the authority to pass such legislation rested on the police
power, and that the police power was inherent in sovereignty and
would lose much of its potentiality if its operation could be de-
feated by contracts whose continued existence would be detri-
mental to the public welfare.65 The rule seems to be that against
the protest of a utility that the law violates its contract rights,
such statutes will be held invalid, but against the protest of a
municipality that the law violates its contract rights, such stat-
utes will be upheld.
All statutes in existence at the time the charter or franchise
is granted do not form part of the contract, unless the legisla-
ture intended to make them a part. For example, a statute al-
lowing a private company to dissolve at its own volition by cer-
terpreted by this court; and in that it would make such continued
service dependent not upon the obligations of the contract but upon
the reasonableness of the proposed abandonment of service." "In so
far as section 504-3 attempts to make the provisions of that and the
preceding section applicable to 'all such service now rendered and
facilities furnished,' it violates the provisions of the Ohio constitution and
the federal constitution as to the impairment of contracts."
63Sec. 504-3 and 504-2. The part in question provided that the
section was to be applicable to "all such service now rendered and
facilities furnished."
64Art. I, sec. 10, U. S. constitution.
65Board of Commissioners of Franklin County v. Public Utility
Commission, (1923) 107 Ohio St. 442, 140 N. E. 87 In the case of E.
Ohio Gas. Co. v. Cleveland, the company withdrew without the consent
of commission as provided for by sec. 504-2 and 504-3 of Ohio Gen-
eral Code. In the instant case, the commission had ordered discon-
tinuance under the same section of the act, and the city protested. The
court rested its decision on the police power but that was not the only
valid ground. It is conceivable that the act might not allow, under the
federal constitution, a commission to order a utility to continue oper-
ation where its franchise contract allowed discontinuance, and yet
such an act might permit the commission to order a utility to dis-
continue, contrary to its contract obligation with a municipality, and
still not violate the federal constitution. As we have previously noted,
such contracts with municipalities are not protected by art. 1, sec. 10
of the U. S. constitution.
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tamn procedure was held not to pertain to a public utility com-
pany 6 Nor did a statute which required the operation of one
train per day over the main line, form a part of the charter con-
tract. The reason for the rule according to the court is that the
state has many laws on its statute books concerning railroads and
it is apparent that there was no intention to make all of these
a part of the charter. The occasion for keeping such matters
where the legislature can deal with them as changing conditions
require, forbids that they be regarded as part of the charter con-
tract. In short, the fact that a particular provision is found in
the statutes of a state relating to railroads does not of itself suf-
fice to show that such provision is part of the charter." If there
was an intention to make a particular statute part of the contract
and such intention had been disclosed plainly, then it would be
so regarded.
8
When a utility is unincorporated, holds no mandatory fran-
chise, and has no special privileges, the only basis for compelling
continuance is statutory "
66Freeo Valley Ry. Co. v. Hodges, (1912) 105 Ark. 314, 151 S. W
281, construing sec. 957 Kirby's Digest. However, see an Old Virginia
Statute (Code of 1904, sec. 1105). This was held to apply to a public
service corporation as well as private company in Jeffries v. Common-
wealth, (1917) 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701. This has since been changed
as might be expected. See Virginia v. Knight, (1923) P U. R_ 1923E
816.
GTiRy. Com. of Tex. v. E. Tex. Ry., (1924) 264 U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct.
247, 68 L. Ed. 569. In this case the road discontinued operation be-
cause it proved a losing venture. Two state laws, it was argued, re-
quired continuity of operation. One required that every railroad train
operate one passenger train per day over its main line, and the other
that a company acquiring a railway under judicial decree shall not
abandon any main track once laid. These two provisions were held
not part of the charter contract.
68See Ry. Com. of Tex. v. E. Texas Ry., (1924) 264 U. S. 79, 44
Sup. Ct. 247, 68 L. Ed. 569; also State of Texas v. Enid, 0. and West-
ern Ry., (1917) 108 Tex. 239, 191 S. W 560. Here was a statutory re-
quirement that railroad would not abandon any part of main track
once constructed. The railroad sought to tear up part. Held that
when the charter was granted and Pccepted, the law provided that
main line should not be moved. The railroad company accepted the
charter subject to the law and impliedly consented to obey it.
69See Re Mrs. G. Guerra, (1922) P U. R. 1922A 237. California
Commission denied application of owner of small telephone company
to discontinue service. Also Re William S. Van Hoosear, (1920)
P U. R. 1920B 924. Owner of a small water utility which apparently
had no franchise and was unincorporated ordered to continue service.
Also State v. Mo. So. Ry., (1919) 279 Mo. 455, 214 S. W 381. Com-
pany operated two spurs not included in its charter and which it had
no franchise to operate. Held that spurs could not be abandoned
without the consent of the commission.
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(d) The obligations to continue service are binding upon
subsequent parties operating a public utility.-The obligations to
continue service from whatever source they arise are binding, not
only upon the original parties, but also upon all subsequent par-
ties operating the utility Purchasers at a foreclosure sale are
so bound. 0 Such an obligation is not like a debt wiped out by
the sale, but inheres in the franchise, and the company which
takes the franchise takes it burdened with the obligation to con-
tinue operation. The same obligation rests upon lessees,7' upon
assignees, 72 and upon receivers.73 A utility consisting of a con-
solidation of several corporations was bound by the obligation of
its predecessor to furnish service even after the exhaustion of
the original field from which the first -corporation furnished gas,
where for some time prior to the exhaustion, the consolidation
had supplied gas from other new fields as well as from the origi-
nal source.74  The duty to continue operation rests with a pur-
chaser despite the fact that he may have no intention of con-
tinuing operation.7 5 Purchasers, lessees and receivers have the
same rights to discontinue as the original parties.
"Purchasers of a railroad at a foreclosure sale have the
same rights as the railroad company to cease operation when it
can only be operated at a loss. ' '76
Whether a road is sold as an entity or in parts is immaterial.
Purchasers of a railroad take it subject to public interest in its
continued operation, whether it is sold in its entirety or in differ-
ent parts to different persons. Such persons take it affected with
the same public interest in its continued operation as existed when
it was in the hands of the former owner 77
"OState v. Cen. Ia. Ry., (1887) 71 Ia. 410, 32 N. W 409" Smith
v. Atlantic So Ry., (1915) P U. R. 1915F 125 (Ia), Cripple Creek
Motor Club Co. v. Colo. Springs and Cripple Creek District Ry.,(1924) P U. R. 1924A 392 (Colo.), State of Tex. v. Enid 0. and W
Ry., (1917) 108 Tex. 239, 191 S. W 560.71Re Charleston Interurban Ry., (1916) P U. R. 1916F 338.
(W Va.).72City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry., (1893) 51 Kan. 609, 33
Pac. 309.73Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Delaware N. R. Co., (D.C. N.Y 1923)
289 Fed. 133.74United Natural Gas. Co. v. Pub. Service Com., (1922) 79 Penn.
Sup. Ct. 58775Virginia v. Knight, (1923) P U. R. 1923E 816 (Va.).
76Bullock v. State of Fla., (1920) 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. 193,
65 L. Ed. 380.77Equity Trust Co. v. Ohio Peoria and St. Louis Ry., (1924) 314
Ill. 96, 145 N. E. 290.
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III TOTAL ABANDONMIENT 8
(a) There are circumstances wider which a public ttility
has a right of total abandomnent.-The better rule appears to be
that there is not an unlimited right on the part of a public utility
to discontinue all service without the consent of the state.", There
are, however, circumstances under which total abandonment may
take place as a matter of right; and there are circumstances under
which it may take place with the consent of the state.
It is submitted, in the first place, that if a franchise contains
express terms requiring continuance, then regardless of the cir-
cumstances which arise to make withdrawal desirable, there is an
obligation to continue operation. Although there is no case sc
holding,80 certain courts have used language which indicates that
there is such a duty
"The rule that constitutional guaranties are infringed by com-
pelling a railway corporation to operate at a loss does not apply
when operation is a positive requirement of the franchise."
Again one court has stated
"That a railroad company cannot be compelled to continue
to operate its railroad when such operation can be carried on only
at a loss is settled. To do so would be taking its property with-
out compensation. Of course a railway company which has
assumed contractual obligations requiring it to operate its road
may be compelled to do so.' 12
Where there is no contract expressly requiring continuance
and the duty arises from some one of the many possible implied
contracts, there is not an absolute obligation under all circum-
stances to continue operation. Certain situations, however, are
not regarded as justifying discontinuance. A dispute with an-
other utility over charges was held to be no grounds for discon-
tinmung service.8 3 Nor was a strike any excuse at law for sus-
pended operation.8 ' In McCran v. the Public Service Ry., the
7 The citations in P U. R. refer to commission decisions.79See footnote 7, Part II, a.
"°See the discussion in the article by 0. P Field, "Withdrawal
from Service of Public Utility Companies," 35 Yale L. J. 169.
$'City of Salina v. Salina St. Ry., (1923) 114 Kan. 734, 220 Pac. 203.82State v. Duluth and N. M. Ry., (1921) 150 Minn. 30, 184 N. W186.
83Miani Gas Co. v. Highleyman, (1919) 77 Fla. 523, 81 So. 775;
Town of Gassaway v. Gas Co., (1914) 75 W Va. 60, 83 S. E. 189; but
see E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron, (1909) 81 Ohio 33, 90 N. E. 46.84McCran v. Public Service Ry., (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 At.
205; see also People v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R., (1883) 28 Hun (N.Y.)
543. Here, of course, it might be impossible for the court to compel
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court stated that a company could not refuse to perform Its duties
because of a controversy with its employees over costs and op-
erating expenses, and that this was not an excuse which had any
validity at law for a company could not discharge its duties on
and off as it happened to find it profitable.8 5 Where a city placed
upon a utility certain burdensome and arbitrary regulations, this
was not regarded as giving a right to discontinue service.80
Among those things which are regarded as justifying total
abandonment, the most common is that of financial loss. As Wy-
man points out in his treatise on Public Service Corporations, the
question of discontinuance of service divorced from loss is not
likely to arise, for people do not as a practical matter abandon a
solvent utility This holds true as a rule but there are reasons
other than loss, for abandoning such an undertaking Generally,
however, the question of loss will be found lurking, somewhere.
One of these is shortage of supply.87 Two reasons for allowing
cessation here are possible--one valid at law, the other a mere
excuse. The obligation of the company is to serve the public only
so long as its supply lasts. This is a term of the contract. When
the supply becomes exhausted, the contract has been fulfilled,
aud hence is terminated automatically The other reason is the
inability to compel continuance where there is nothing with which
to continue. But a consolidated company was not allowed to dis-
continue service where the field from which its predecessor had
supplied a town had become exhausted, and where for many years
it had supplied the town not only from the original field but from
certain new fields opened. 88 Where a telegraph company had
vainly tried to renew its contract for a right of way along a rail-
road but was unable to do so, this was considered justification for
discontinuance. 89
By far the largest and most important class of cases pertains
to utilities which have been operating at a loss. On the question
of under what circumstances it will be deemed that a utility is
continuance by mandamus or injunction. Even so there would be no
right of discontinuance.
85See footnote 84.
86City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas and Elec. Power Co.,
(1913) 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919.
87St. Clairsville v. Public Utility Commission, (1921) 102 Ohio
St. 574, 132 N. E. 151.88United Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Service Com., (1922) 79 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 560.89State v. W U. Teleg. Co., (1922) 208 Ala. 228, 94 So. 466.
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operating at a loss, there is a difference of opimon. So far as
this problem is concerned, it matters not whether the utility is
seeking to discontinue as a matter of right or whether it is seek-
ing permission from the state to withdraw. Hence, both classes
of cases have been gathered together. That a hopeless condition
of insolvency is not necessary is clear. Some cases contend that
if a company is not making expenses, depreciation, taxes and a
reasonable return upon its investment, it is operating at a loss.
"It is fundamental, that a utility or other public service cor-
poration cannot be required indefinitely to operate without a rea-
sonable return upon its investment. ")0O "It is earnestly con-
tended on behalf of petitioners that service cannot be abandoned
unless its operating revenues are msufficient to meet operating
expenses. We do not flunk this contention is sound. A railroad
is not a philanthropic enterprise and while it owes duties to the
public, it also owes duties of perhaps equal importance to the in-
vestors in its securities. The holders of its securities are entitled
to a return upon their investment and there is no basis in reason
for requiring them to donate their capital. " "It is the opin-
ion of this commission that a loss results when a public service
corporation fails to earn its fair operating expenses, maintenance
charges, depreciation, taxes and a reasonable rate of return upon
a fair valuation of its property 3)91
In most of the cases it will be found, however, that although
the court discussed fair return and depreciation, actually the util-
ity was not even earning operating expenses. In none of these
decisions, with the exception of Re Denver, Boidder and Western
R.,92 was the company allowed to withdraw merely because it
was not making depreciation charges or a fair return. 3
Other cases have held that the company was not operating
at a loss until it failed to make operating expenses and taxes.
"We find no decision holding that a failure to yield a reasonable
return constitutes a justification for abandoning the operation of
a railroad."''9 In another case the railway's receipts were barely
9ORe Red River Mfg. Co., (1924) P U. R. 1924D 385 (Wis.). Here
company was allowed to discontinue. However, it was not making
operating expenses in this case.
90 Virginia v. Knight, (1923) P U. R. 1923E 816 (Va.). Here com-
pany was not allowed to discontinue, but it was on the grounds that
no fair value was shown.
92p. U. R. 1919F 9 (Colo.). In this case it appears depreciation
expenses were not being made.
93Re Batesville Gas Co., (1917) P. U. R. 1917F 662 (Ind.Y; Re Red
River Mfg. Co., (1924) P U. R. 1924D 385 (Wis.); Virginia v.
Knight, (1923) P. U. R. 1923E 816 (Va.).
9 4Smith v. Atlantic So. Ry., (1915) P U. R. 1915F 125 (Iowa).
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enough to pay operating expenses, leaving nothing for dividends
and new equipment. In that case it was decided, among other
things that a fair return and depreciation were not items to be
considered in determining whether a company was operating at
a loss so as to entitle it to discontinue.9 5 The true rule can be
determined only by a consideration of the reason why a company
need not continue operation at a loss. The reason is that com-
pelling such continuance constitutes a taking of property for pub-
lic use without just compensation, 90 in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.07 But it is difficult to deter-
mine what constitutes taking here without just compensation. It
may be true for rates and rate purposes that it is taking prop-
erty when a company is required to operate and in so doing can-
not earn depreciation and a fair return. But what may be con-
trary to the fourteenth amenidment for rate purposes may not be
for discontinuance. There is more necessity for the exercise of
police power in requiring continuity of operation than in main-
taining a certain rate. The injury to the public is more serious
in the former case than in the latter. Hence the police power is
more extensive in the one case than in the other. Although a
utility may be entitled to a rate which will give it a fair return,
it ought to be required to continue service even though it cannot
make a fair return at any rate level.
A statute of New Mexico may shed some light on this prob-
lem. There the fact that the road cannot pay more than operat-
ing expenses is not considered a sufficient excuse for discon-
tinuance.98
An interesting Icase is presented where a company has for
years been prosperous but has set aside nothing for repairs, de-
preciation or reserve. Shall it then later when when it incurs
losses be entitled to discontinueP
See the statement of the court in Ft. Smith Light and Traction Co. v.
Bourland, (1925) 267 U. S. 336, 45 Sup. Ct. 249, 69 L. Ed. 631.95Re Durango Ry. and Realty Co., (1920) P U. R. 1920B 505
(Colo.). There were other reasons for refusing to allow discontinuance,
in this case, however.96Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251
U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323.97Article XIV, constitution of the United States.98New Mex. Laws 1921, chap. 200, sec. 5. So far as the section
is important, it reads, "The fact that the income from the operation
of the road is not sufficient to pay more than operating expenses shall
not be considered as showing a loss."9OThe problem was presented in the case of Re Oxford Elec.
Co., (1920) P U. R. 1920A 852, (Maine).
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Two principles are certain. In the first place, the loss must
be permanent, not temporary. That is, either the loss must have
existed for some time so as to demonstrate the impossibility of
operation at a profit, or there must be no reasonable prospect of
remunerative operation in the future."0 And, secondly, there is
a presumption against loss. The company must give satisfactory
evidence that it cannot operate at a profit.10'
Where there is no express obligation in the charter, and
the only duty arises from some implied contract, the general rule
is that companies may discontinue where operating at a loss.102
There are several reasons for this. The first has already been
suggested. To require operation of a utility at a loss is a taking
of property without just compensation for public use and hence
a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States con-
stitution.'0 3 If the company retains its charter or franchise, it
would seem that it cannot then plead a violation of the four-
teenth amendment.10 ' The second reason sometimes given is that
there has been a failure of consideration, hence the railroad is
relieved of its obligation. It may be that neither has broken the
contract, but a failure to use causes a failure of revenue and
hence a failure of consideration. The contract is terminated by
this failure of consideration 0 5 Still another reason might be
given. The public no longer needs the service as is evidenced by
its failure to use, hence the company has fulfilled its charter ob-
10ORe Loyalton Electric Co., (1915) P U. R. 1915C 804 (Calif.).
lOlSee footnote 100.
10 2Morris v. Atlanta No. Ry., (1925) 160 Ga. 775, 129 S. E. 68;
Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S. 396,
40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; State of Texas v. E. Tex. Ry., (D.C.Tex.
1922) 283 Fed. 584; Ry. Com. of Tex. v. E. Tex. Ry., (1924) 264
U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct. 247, 68 L. Ed. 569; Ft. Smith Light and Trac-
tion Co. v. Bourland, (1925) 267 U. S. 336, 45 Sup. Ct. 249, 69 L Ed.
631, Contra State of Kan. v. Dodge City, M. and T. Ry., (1894) 53
Kan. 377, 36 Pac. 747
203Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S.
396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; State of Tex. v. E. Tex. Ry. Co.,(D.C.Tex. 1922) 283 Fed. 584; Ry. Com. of Tex. v. E. Tex. Ry.,
(1924) 264 U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct. 247, 68 L Ed. 569.O14See Ft. Smith Light and Traction Co. v. Bourland, (1925) 267
U. S. 336, 45 Sup. Ct. 249, 69 L. Ed. 631. The court stated, "This com-
pany is at liberty to surrender its franchise and discontinue operations
throughout the city. It cannot, in the absence of contract, be com-
pelled to operate its system at a loss But the constitution does
not confer upon a company the right to continue to enjoy the fran-
chise and escape from burdens incident to its use."i05State of Tex. v. E. Tex. Ry., (D.C.Tex. 1922) 283 Fed. 584.
See page 592.
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ligations or its duty by statute. Another reason has been sug-
gested by the courts-that of the impossibility of compelling con-
tinuance. It is useless for a court to issue a mandamus against
an impossibly insolvent utility 100
"Mandamus will not be issued to compel company to re-
build, equip or operate such a road since without money or finan-
cial resources of any kind whatsoever, the company would be un-
able to comply with such order and its issue would avail noth-
ing."' 0 7  "Refusal of permission to sell this property will not
give an electric railway service The corporation might be
ordered to give such service but it cannot comply "108 "Eco-
nomic law, if no other, will prevent a utility from continuing busi-
ness after it has been demonstrated beyond a doubt that it is a los-
ing venture. Under the conditions named, no order could be
made that the service be continued which could be enforced. The
road cannot run without money, and no one will invest money in
an undertaking which is known to be a failure."10
This is hardly a reason but rather an acknowledgment of the fail-
ure of adequate legal remedies.
It may be that the obligation to continue service arises as a
result of a special grant of money from the state, city, or private
citizens. The obligation here may be the result of an implied
contract, or it may arise from statute. Many states have spe-
cial laws governing this situation.120 Even though the company is
losing money, it may not quit, unless it repays the sums which
it has received."1 The rule in Michigan requires payment of in-
1°eState ex rel. Collins v. L S. W Ry., (1922) 128 Miss. 312, 91
So. 7 Gasser v. Garden Bay Ry. Co., (1919) 205 Mich. 5, 171 N. W
791, see also Coe v. Columbus, Piqua and Indiana Ry., (1859) 10 Ohio
St. 372.07State ex rel. Collins v. L. S. W Ry., (1922) 128 Miss. 312, 91
So. 7
'
08Re Rockland, So. Thomaston and St. Geo. Ry., (1918) P U. R.
1918E 877 (Maine).
'
09Re Exeter, Hampton, Amesbury Street Ry., (1919) P U. R.
1919B 251 (N.H.).
10lIowa, Statutes: sec. 2094 and 2095; Iowa Compiled Code 1919,
sec. 5141, sec. 5142. Michigan, Statutes of 1887 Act 275, p. 373 as
amended 1891, Act 125, p. 147; Compiled Statutes of 1915, sec. 8363
and 8364. Illinois Statutes: Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, page 713, chap. 32,
sec. 50. " And, provided, further, that no company shall by virtue
hereof, change its place of business from any town, county or munici-
pality where the inha'bitants thereof, or any person therein shall
have donated any money or valuable things to induce such, cor-
poration to locate in such town, county or municipality." Quoted in
Re. Sidell & 0. Ry., (1918) P U. R. 1918E 660 (Ill.). Interpreted as
forbidding a railway company to discontinue service.
"'State v. Beaton, (1920) 190 Ia. 216, 178 N. W 1.
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terest as well."' In one case, at least, the railway was not en-
titled to cease operation at all where the state had donated to
it land. The railroad was seeking to abandon only one unprof-
itable branch of its whole system. Whether the rule would have
been the same if the entire system was being operated at a loss,
is hard to say. The court stated
'Where a railway company has received a grant of land from
the state upon condition that it would build a road from one town
to another it has no authority whatever afterwards to abandon
any such portion of the line and take it up and remove the track.
The unprofitableness of operating the road furnishes no excuse
whatever for a failure to comply with the conditions of the
grant."l 3
An interesting problem appears where the company is en-
gaged in several enterprises which as a whole are profitable, but
one of them, a public utility service, is not. This may take two
forms. One of the enterprises may be a public utility venture but
the other not."1 4 Or all may be public services but of different
kinds, as gas, street railway, electricity, water and heating." 5
So far as the rules are concerned in these two cases, there is no
difference. In either, the utility may abandon the unprofitable
undertaking."18 Each enterprise is regarded as a distinct entity,
and the fact that they are accidentally connected through the same
company is quite immaterial.
"Where a public utility corporation is engaged in furnishing
to the public through various departments of its business differ-
ent kinds of services, it cannot be compelled to carry on a branch
of its business wIch furnishes one kind of such service at a loss,
even though the entire business be profitable.""' 7
There are two reasons given, but after all they resolve them-
selves into one. In the first place, it is a taking of property with-
121n re Flint and Pere Marquette Ry., (1892) 91 Mich. 293, 51
N. W 1001.
11 Nebraska v. Sioux City and Pac. Ry., (1878) 7 Neb. 357
11"Brooks Scanlon Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S. 396,
40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323.
115No. Ill. Light and Traction Co. v. Commerce Commission, (1922)
302 Ill. 11, 134 N. E. 142; Mt. Carmel Public Service Co. v. Commis-
sion, (1921) 297 Ill. 303, 130 N. E. 693; Re St. Croix Gas Light Co.,
(1919) P U. R. 1919A 487 (Maine).
"'Brooks Scanlon Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S. 396, 40
Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; No. Ill. Light and Traction Co. v. Com-
merce Commission, (1922) 302 Ill. 11, 134 N. E. 142; Mt. Carmel Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Commission, (1921) 297 Ill. 303, 130 N. E. 693; Re St.
Croix Gas Light Co., (1919) P U. R. 1919A 487 (Maine).
"1 Mt. Carmel Pub. Service Co. v. Commission, (1921) 297 Ill.
303, 130 N. E. 693.
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out due process of law and hence a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 18 Another reason given is that justice requires that
each utility should be supported by those receiving its service,
and not by those receiving a service of some other kind. 119
"Each branch or class of its [a public utility company's]
business must be considered separately for purposes of rate mak-
ing or discontinuance of service. The reason for the rule is
quite obvious. A gas user ought not to be required to maintain
an electric light service nor an electric light service a street rail-
way service. The users of each utility must support it whether
owned by one entity or three distinct entities.120
Whichever reason is used, it comes to a question of taking prop-
erty without due process of law In the one case, it is a taking of
the property of the company On the other hand, if a commis-
sion orders an increase of rates in a gas service to support elec-
tric service, then it is the property of the gas consumers which
is taken without due process of law The general rule holds even
where other contracts for electricity, etc., have been granted with
the understanding that the railway would have to be operated for
a considerable period of time at a loss.12 It was decided that
where three services were linked together in one ordinance and
as such all parts of the same contract between the city and the
company, the utility could not cease operation of one of the en-
terprises which had proved unprofitable. 2 2  The utilities were
looked upon as one unit, and could not be separated one from
the other. There is a danger in following this theory too far,
especially if the doctrine is carried into the field of rate making.
Rates in one service might be raised to a high level and made to
support all other enterprises. In another case thd utility was not
allowed to abandon one of its unprofitable services where the rates
were fixed at the request of the company so as to enable it to
earn a fair return upon all enterprises. 21
"28 Brooks Scanlon Lumber Co. v. Ry. Com. of La., (1920) 251 U. S.
396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323; Mt. Carmel Pub. Service Co. v.
Commission, (1921) 297 Ill. 303, 130 N. E. 693.IgRe Exeter, Hampton, Amesbury Street Ry., (1918) P U. R.
1919B 251 (N.H.).
120Re Trinidad Electric Transmission, Ry. & Gas Co., (1922)
P U. R. 1922C 299 (Colo.).
12'Re Trinidad Elec. Transmission Ry., (1920) P U, R. 1920F
707 (Colo.).
122City of Spartenburg v. S. C. Gas and Elec. Co., (1924) 130
S. C. 125, 125 S. E. 295.
2'Re Helena Light and Ry. Co., (1923) P U. R. 1923C 780
(Mont.).
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Even though there is a right of discontinuance, a utility has
no right to cease operation arbitrarily. An opportunity must be
given the community to bid for and buy the utility, before it is
discontinued. In Gress v. Village of Fort Loramnte, a chancery
court ordered the road discontinued and dismantled, but allowed
an opportunity, first, to purchase within thirty days as a going
concern.2 4 If it be found that operation in any form or by any
persons is impossible and abandonment is the only alternative still
the utility will not be allowed to cease operation until the com-
munity has had an opportunity to adjust itself to changed condi-
tions.12- In any case, notice is essential before discontinuance.
This was true even by the rules of common law.12 In discuss-
ing the question of what is reasonable notice, Wyman declares
"It must be admitted that little law as yet exists as to the
length of notice that must be given. But it may be asserted with
confidence that what is reasonable notice in a particular case de-
pends upon the character of the business. A teamster might with-
draw upon a day's notice, doubtless, as his patrons may quickly
make other arrangements. A canal boatman might tie up at
the end of any trip, for the other opportunities for shippers over
the canal are numerous. But a railroad company may not with-
out a long notice abandon its line. And a gas company could
only abandon after a long enough period to provide a new sup-
ply. It is not principally the special privileges which these serv-
ice compames have received that makes their withdrawal difficult,
it is because the duplication of these particular services takes a
long time, and therefore the public is so dependent upon the es-
tablished service that it would lead to intolerable hardships if
proprietors were permitted to withdraw without long notice. A
rule of law to meet all conditions would have to go so far as to say
one cannot withdraw from public service without notice suffi-
ciently long to enable those deprived of the service to make the
necessary arrangements for the provision of other service."127
The Oio statutes have set forth certain requirements for no-
tice. 2 ' The village must be given actual notice and the private
consumers published notice.
We now come to a consideration of the question of sur-
"24 Gress v. Village of Fort Laramie, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 35, 125
N. E. 112; Gasser v. Garden Bay Ry., (1919) 205 Mich. 5, 171 N. V 791.
125N. Y. Trust Co. v. Buffalo and Lake Erie Traction Co., (1920)
112 Misc. Rep. 414, 183 N. Y. S. 278.
"26 See notice and rules at common law, Part II.
1271 Wyman, Public Service Corporations, sec. 317 Quoted in Re
Tidewater and Western Ry., (1917) P U. R. 1917E 798 (Va.).
"28 Ohio, Gen. Code Sec. 504-2, 504-3.
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rendering a franchise in connection with discontinuance. Wyman
states that a company may by this device discontinue service.
"But even in the case of a railroad company which has ac-
cepted extraordinary privileges, it would seem that if it is ready
to give up its charter, it may withdraw from its entire under-
taking.1 1
29
This is equivalent to saying that if a company desires to with-
draw it may do so at its pleasure. As one author has put it, this
merely begs the question.130 This is going back to the doctrine
of Jeffres v. Commonwealth,"' which the legislature has ex-
pressly overruled, that of allowing the same withdrawal privileges
to public companies which are accorded to private companies. Of
course, if the company is willing to give up its property to the
public, this should alter the situation.13 2  Where there is a right
to discontinue, there is some question as to whether the company
must surrender its charter. In Morris v. Atlanta Northern Ry.,
the court said that a company having the right to withdraw might
discontinue whether or not it had surrendered its franchise.133
In McCran v. Public Service Ry. it was said "So long as a
company retains its charter it is obliged to operate. It cannot con-
sistently keep the franchise and reason that such performance
would be unremunerative." ' 14
There should be no great difficulty arising from a discussion
of the right of a municipality to discontinue a public utility en-
terprise. Certainly its right will not be greater than that of a
private company, and probably it will be less. It could not plead
the taking of private property for public purpose if it were op-
erating at a loss. There are not many cases in point. One held
that a municipality codld not discontinue service on a ferry "'
Nor could a city refuse to continue a water supply to a person
1221 Wyman, Public Service Corporations, sec. 296. Quoted but not
followed in Re Denver, Laramie and No. Ry., (1917) P U. R. 1917F
744 (Colo.).
130See the article in 35 Yale L. J. 169 by Oliver P Field, "The
Withdrawal from Service of Public Utility Companies."
131(1917) 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.
"32Lyon and Hoag v. Ry Comm., (1920) 183 Cal. 145, 190 Pac.
795.
'33(1925) 160 Ga. 775, 129 S. E. 68.
'
3 4McCran v. Pub. Service Ry., (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 Ati.
205, see also re Batesville Gas Co., (1917) P U. R. 1917F 622 (Ind.).
There the company had surrendered its municipal franchise and had
given evidence of its willingness to surrender its charter. Was al-
lowed to discontinue.
135n re Wheeler, (1908) 62 Misc. Rep. 37 115 N. Y S. 605.
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outside the city, where the municipality had purchased the water
plant from a private company which had been supplying outside
customers. 136 The O1o statute pertaining to discontinuance
seems to make no distinction between municipal corporations and
private companies or individuals."3 7
There is some conflict of authority as to who is entitled to
bring suit against a company for discontinuance. Logically it
should be the party to the contract, the party against whom the
breach has been committed. Where the contract is with the state
itself, the state may sue."3 In commenting upon the right of
the state to sue, the court has declared
"But it is said that the state is not injured and has no inter-
est in the question whether the corporation perform the duty or
not. The sovereignty of the state is injured whenever any
public function vested by it in any person for the common
good is not used, misused or abused. Such an injury wounds
the sovereignty of the state itself and thereby, in a legal sense,
injuries the body politic.' 3 9
The suit may be brought, where permitted by various agencies in
the name of the state, by the attorney general,'" by private par-
ties or by municipalities. 4 ' If the contract is one between a mu-
nicipality and a utility, such municipality is a proper party to
bring the suit. 42 Where the contract is with a private party, the
-36 Fellows v. City of Los Angeles, (1907) 151 Cal. 52, 90 Pac. 13737ZOhio, Gen. Code 504-2 and 504-3.
138 State v. Ia. Cen. Ry., (1887) 71 Iowa 410, 32 N. W 409; Kansas
v. Dodge City Ry., (1894) 53 Kan. 377, 36 Pac. 747- State v. Western
Union Teleg. Co., (1922) 208 Ala. 228, 94 So. 466; Texas v. East Tex.
Ry., (D.C.Tex. 1922) 283 Fed. 584; South Carolina v. Jack, (C.C.A. 4th.
Cir. 1906) 145 Fed. 281, People v. Col. Title and Trust Co., (1918)
65 Colo. 427, 178 Pac. 6.
139 People v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R., (1883) 28 Hun (N.Y.) 543.
"40 McCran v. Pub. Service Ry., (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 AlI.
205; Att'y Gen. v. West Wis. Ry., (1874) 36 Wis. 466.
1'People ex rel. Cantrell v. St. Louis, A. and T. H. Ry., (1896)
176 Ill. 512, 45 N. E. 824; State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Public
Service Commission, (1924) 303 Mo. 505, 260 S. W 973; State ex rel.
Grmsfelder v. Spokane Street Ry., (1898) 19 Wash. 518, 53 Pac. 719-
State ex rel. City of Bridgeton v. Bridgeton Traction Co., (1899) 62
N. J. L. 592, 43 Atl. 715; State ex rel. Collins v. L. S. W Ry., (1922)
128 Miss. 312, 91 So. 7; State ex rel. Knight v. Helena Power and
Light Co., (1899) 22 Mont. 39, 56 Pac. 685.l42City of Salina v. Salina Street Ry., (1923) 114 Kan. 734, 220
Pac. 203; City of Helena v. Helena Light and Rail Co., (1922) 63
Mont. 108, 207 Pac. 337; City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas and
Elec. Power Co., (1913) 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919; St. Clairsville v.
P U. Commission, (1921) 102 Ohio St. 574, 132 N. E. 151, City of
Hampton v. Newport News and Hampton Ry., (1926) 144 Va. 29, 131
S. E. 328; City of Jamestown v. Penn Gas Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1924)
1 F (2d) 871.
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private party may sue.1 43 Some courts hold that where the con-
tract is with the state or municipality private persons have no
right to sue even though they have been injured by the breach.1 4 4
This seems the better rule. The injury is primarily to the state,
the breach is of a contract with the state. The proper party to
sue is the party to the contract. However, in some cases indi-
viduals have been allowed to sue in their own names. 5 "The
contract with the city was made for the benefit of its resi-
dents and they are the proper parties to enforce their
rights thereunder. ,,14" Where citizens are allowed to main-
tain such suits possibly it is on the grounds of third party benefi-
ciary contracts, possibly on the grounds of agency for the state. It
is difficult to determine. A minority stockholder has no right to
sue for an injunction to prevent discontinuance.1 4?T
Finally comes a consideration of the remedies available where
there is an unlawful abandonment. Obviously, mandamus will
lie to compel a utility to perform a statutory duty It will also
lie to compel the fulfillment of a duty arising from charter. 14 8
The writ of mandamus may be used to enforce a public duty grow-
ing out of contract as well as out of statute. 9 Mandamus may
also be used to enforce a duty arising from a franchise granted
143Louisiana and N. Ry. v. Johnson s Administratrix, (1925) 207
Ky. 813, 270 S. W 50; Gray v. C. M. and St. Paul Ry., (1901) 189
Ill. 400, 59 N. E. 950.
144Asher v. Hutchinson Light and Power Co., (1903) 66 Kan. 496,
71 Pac. 813; an injunction held not to lie at the suit of an individual
to prohibit the removal of water mains, notwithstanding the fact that
it greatly decreased the value of his property. Day v. Tacoma Ry.
and Power Co., (1914) 80 Wash. 161, 141 Pac. 347
'45Miami Gas Co. v. Highleyman, (1919) 77 Fla. 523, 81 So. 775.
Here residents of Miami were grantedan injunction against a company
which was threatening to discontinue service. Macon Ry. and Light
Co. v. Corbin, (1923) 155 Ga. 1, 116 S. E. 305. See also Central Bank
and Trust Corp. v. Cleveland, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1918), 252 Fed. 530.
Here a number of nearby residents were allowed to intervene although
they could not obtain an injunction. See Helena and Livingston Smelt-
ing and Reduction Co. v. Nor. Pac. Ry., (1922) 62 Mont. 205, 204 Pac.
370. The court stated there that a private person may move for man-
damus or injunction upon the theory that he is a member of the
public and suffering some of the damage which affects the public
generally, and that he sues not only for himself but as agent on be-
half of the people. Atlantic and B. Ry. v. Kirkland, (1907) 129 Ga.
552, 59 S. E. 220.
146Miami Gas Co. v. Highleyman, (1919) 77 Fla. 523, 81 So. 775.
147Moore v. Lewisburg and R. Elec. Co., (1917) 80 W Va. 653,
93 S. E. 762.
14SPeople ex rel. Cantrell v. St. Louis A. and T H. Ry., (1896)
176 Ill. 512, 45 N. E. 824.
1
49 McCran v.Pub. Ser. Ry., (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 Atl. 205.
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by the city."5° It is not, however, the proper remedy where the
breach is discontinuance contrary to the provisions of a purely
private contract entered into by a public utility 1-.t The courts
have refused to issue a mandamus ordering a railway to relay its
tracks and to recommence operation, where the line has been dis-
continued and dismantled for some time.25 2 "There is a wide dif-
ference between an effort by mandamus to compel action of this
character, and a proceeding by injunction to stop the tearing up
of a railroad track. 153 Courts are much less likely to grant the
former than the latter. The distinction cannot be based upon a
difference in obligation, but is rather based upon the inefficacy
of a particular remedy Where a railway had abandoned a road
between two points named in its franchise although an action for
mandamus might have been allowed, an action for specific per-
formance was -not the proper remedy '5"
As an alternative to mandamus the state may institute quo
warranto proceedings to deprive the company of its franchise. "
The difficulty with this lies in the fact that it is not the sort of
remedy wanted for the breach. What is wanted is continuity
of operation. 56 The remedy is effective, however, where a com-
pany has discontinued only a part of its system, or suspended
operation 57  Pending quo warranto proceedings or mandamus,
a preliminary mandatory injunction may be granted to compel
operation durihg a determination of these other suits. 5 8
If a utility is threatening to tear up its tracks or discontinue
service in violation of its contract duties, an injunction is the
proper remedy'-5 9 This is true even where the breach is one of
15oCity of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry., (1893) 51 Kan. 609, 33
Pac. 309; City of Salina v. Salina Street Ry., (1923) 114 Kan. 734.
220 Pac. .203.
25'State ex rel. Thiebaud v. Connersville Gas Co., (1904) 163 Ind.
563, 71 N. E. 483.
52Jack v. Williams, (C.C.S.C. 1902) 113 Fed. 823; State ex rel.
Collins v. L. S. W Ry., (1922) 128 Miss. 312, 91 So. 7.
15 3Brown v. Atlantic Ry. Co., (1906) 126 Ga. 248, 55 S. E. 24. See
also So. Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, (1917) 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W 694.
.
54People v. Vt. and Albany Ry., (1861) 37 Barb. (N.Y.) 216.
155Att'y Gen. v. West Wis. Ry., (1874) 36 Wis. 466.
'
56People v. N. Y. C. and H. I. R. Co., (1883) 28 Hun (N.Y.)
543. "It (the state) may proceed, it is true, to annul the corporation,
as has been held in many cases where corporations had neglected pub-
lic duties. But that remedy is not adequate, for it only destroys
functions where the public interests require their continued existence
and enforcement"
15McCran v. Pub. Service Ry., (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 At. 205.
15sSee footnote 157
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private contract. 180 As we have noted before, private parties are
permitted by some courts to sue in their own names to enjoin
discontinuance or relocation. In one case the court stated that if
the suit was to be allowed, such persons must show special dam-
ages not merely as members of the public, but by reason of their
residences or location of their busnesses. 10 1 A public service
commission, however, is a purely administratitve body and as such
has no power to issue injunctions."'
If the breach is one of private contract the injured party
may maintain a suit for damages.8 3 If the breach is a breach of
a franchise or charter obligation, the private individual is not
entitled to damages, even though he may have suffered a consid-
erable loss by such relocation. 18 4 A member of the public has no
such vested interest in the continuance of a railroad location as to
entitle him to recover damages either at common law or upon the
constitutional guarantee of compensation for private property
taken for public use.18 5
"When we come to consider the question of the right to main-
tain an action for damages, then complications arise which do not
appear in an action for mandamus or injunction, for in the former
is involved the attempt of the individual to secure for himself
alone damages which he has suffered, but which are of the same
nature as those suffered by other members of the public, although
there may be a difference in the degree of damage."1 8
Parties who have been negligent in not bringing action against
public utilities apparently lose their right of action.16'
159Kansas v. Dodge City, M. and T. Ry., (1894) 53 Kan. 377, 36
Pac. 747; Miami Gas Co. v. Highleyman, (1919) 77 Fla. 523, 81 So.775- Town of Gassaway v. Gas Co., (1914) 75 W Va. 60, 83 S. E. 189.
'6osee State ex rel. Thiebaud v. Connersville Gas Co., (1904) 163
Ind. 563, 71 N. E. 483.
161Atlantic and B. Ry. Co. v. Kirkland, (1907) 129 Ga. 552, 59
S. E. 220.
162Re Lake Eric, Bowling Green and Napoleon Ry., (1916) P U.
R. 1916F 553 (Ohio).
'163Durden et al. v. So. Ry., (1907) 2 Ga. App. 66, 58 S. E. 299" I.
and G. N. Ry. v. Sallie Dawson, (1884) 62 Tex. 260.
1'4Bryan v. Louisville and N. Ry., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1917) 244 Fed.
650" Kinealy et al. v. St. L., Kan. City and Nor. Ry., (1879) 69 Mo. 658
Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Co. v. Northern Pac.
Ry., (1922) 62 Mont. 205, 204 Pac. 370.
265Bryan v. Louisville and N. Ry., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1917) 244 Fed.
650; See also Bryan v. L. and N. Ry., (1921) 292 Mo. 535, 238 S. W
484.
661Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Co. v. Northern
Pac. Ry., (1922) 63 Mont. 205, 204 Pac. 370.
167See Public Service Com. v. Phil. B. and W Ry., (1914) 122 Md.
438. 89 At. 726.
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(b) There are circumstances under ich a public utility
will be allowed to discontinic all service with the consent of the
state.-It is obvious that a public utility may discontinue all serv-
ice with the consent of the other party to the contract. In most
cases this would be the state. The legislative authority in a state
can absolve a utility from its contract obligations to continue
operation. This it does not do directly, but through. statute it
designates an agent, usually a public service commission, to al-
low abandonment under certain circumstances.
Many states have provided that public utilities slall be al-
lowed to discontinue service upon certain grounds only The
statutes of New York and Minnesota, for example, allow dis-
continuance only when the public no longer requires the service."'s
If the company were operating at a loss, this would be no grounds
for approval of discontinuance. However, there would be, it is
submitted, a constitutional right to discontinue. The converse
of the proposition would hold also. A company ii obtaining the
commission's consent would not be obliged to show a loss but to
show only that the public did not need the service.
Public service commissions have worked out in a number of
decisions the circumstances under which they will allow aban-
donment. A dispute with another utility over charges was held
to be no grounds for discontinuing service.1 10 Neither was fear
of loss grounds upon which the commission would permit with-
drawal. °7 0 Nor could one company shift the burden of service
upon another merely by showing that such other company serves
the consumers in the vicinity I'l A mere desire to escape the re-
sponsibility of operation was not deemed a valid excuse." Cer-
tain things are regarded as proper grounds for authorizing dis-
continuance. Among the most common of these is that the pub-
lic no longer needs the service . 73 Again if the company is op-
erating at a loss, this is grounds for approving withdrawal.17'
"'8See the New York and Minnesota statutes cited in Part V
"O'Kathryn Telephone Co. v. Strinden, (1926) P U. R. 1926D 729.
'ORe Durango Ry. and Realty Co., (1919) P U. R. 1920B 505
(Colo.). "A street railway having received valuable rights and privi-
leges from the public and having entered upon the engagement or
them cannot be permitted to cease its activities upon mere fear that
decreased income will result."
17 'Dwight v. Lyon and Hoag, (1919) P U. R. 1919F 519 (Calif.).
"'2Re Gilmonton Roller Mills Co., (1920) P U. R. 1921B 815 (Wis.).
'"3Commissions always emphasize this in allowing abandonment.
174Re Rockland, So. Thomaston and St. Geo. Ry., (1918) P U. R.
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Shortage of natural gas supply appears to be an adequate excuse
for allowing withdrawal.' 5
Even though a commission may allow withdrawal it is clear
that it will be allowed only as a last resort.170 All other possible
measures must first be exhausted."' A utility must first try a
new schedule of rates in the hope that this may enable it to make
a profit.
"A public utility will not without a previous application to
increase rates be authorized by the New Jersey Commission to
discontinue service, since the utility should exhaust every possi-
ble effort to give the service required.' 11
8
It is not necessary to attempt a new schedule of rates in all cases
before abandonment. Where it would be useless, and that fact
appears obvious to the commission such a trial is not required.
An electric utility was allowed to abandon service rather than
increase its rates where in order to meet out-of-pocket expenses
it would have been necessary to increase charges one hundred per
cent over existing rates.1
7 9
An effort should also be made to increase revenues by im-
proving the quality of service rendered by a utility 180 If rev-
enues can be increased by diminished service, that is a pre-requi-
site to abandonment.' 81 Substitution of service is sometimes a pre-
1918E 877 (Me.), Re Exeter, Hampton, Amesbury St. Ry., (1918)
P U. R. 1919B 251 (N.H.).
1
7 5 See re Ohio Fuel Supply Co., (1920) P U. R. 1921A 628 (Ohio).
76The cases for total and partial discontinuance have been con-
sidered together here for the rules are practically the same.
177Up-to-date Mining Co. v. P U. "Comm., (1921) 69 Colo. 309,
174 Pac. 617 The Public Service Commission will make an order for
dismantling a railroad only after every reasonable effort made in good
faith to increase the earnings, and if under such economical manage-
ment public will not support it. See also Seashore Gas Co., (1917)
P U. R. 1918A 871 (N.J.).
178Re Seashore Gas Co., (1917) P U. R. 1918A 871 (N.J.). Also
Re Kampsville Elec. Light and Power Co., (1920) P U. R. 1920F
133 (Ill.). The Illinois Commission will not authorize abandonment
of service by an electric company upon the ground that it is operating
at a loss, where it appears that no application for an increase in rates
has been presented before the Commission. See also Re Mrs. Guerra,
(1922) P U. R. 1922A 237 (Calif.).
27 9Re Marshfield Elec. Co., (1918) P U. R. 1919B 572 (Mo.).
Also Ex Parte Cen. Ill. Pub. Service Co., (1915) P U. R. 1916B
920 (Ill.).
'
8ORe Napa Valley Elec. Co., (1917) P U. R. 1918A 539 (Calif.).
A Gas Company was refused permission to discontinue service where
it appeared that company's lack of business was due to wretched service.
181Re Boise Valley Traction Co., (1922) P U. R. 1923A 441 (Idaho).
There the court indicated three steps which should be taken before
abandonment:
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requisite. In Re Oregon Short Ltne Ry., a railway was allowed
to suspend operation during the winter, but other facilities were
ordered for transporting passengers, mail, express and freight.1 8-
If none of the above remedies prove adequate, the community
should be permitted to guarantee a return. But this return must
be satisfactory 183 Whether it should be merely enough to meet
operating expenses, or a reasonable return as well, the cases do
not say An opportunity must also be given the community to
bid for and buy the utility, before it is discontinued.18 ' The pur-
chase price should be the price at which it could be sold for junk.
The New Hampshire commission declared that the owner of a
public utility to be abandoned should offer the property for sale
to anyone who might wish to purchase it for the purpose of con-
tinuing its operation as a public utility at a price not exceeding
that which could be obtained for it if disposed of otherwise. 18
If it be found that operation in any form or by any persons
is impossible and abandonment is the only alternative, the utility
will not be allowed to cease operation until the community has
had an opportunity to adjust itself to changed conditions.18 8 A
commission,, for example, made an order which allowed consum-
ers an opportunity to develop new water supplies.18 7 A heating
company was not allowed to discontinue service in the middle of
August when patrons would not have had time to make new
arrangements before cold weather 88
a. Increase in revenue through increase in rates or decrease in
operating expenses.
b. Guarantee of deficit by those who insist upon a continuance
of the service.
c. A sale of facilities to those who desire the service continued.
182(1914) P U. R. 1915A 383 (Idaho). Also, Re Union Traction
Co., (1925) 'P. U. R. 1925E 503 (Calif.); Re Indianapolis St. Ry.,
(1926) P. U. R. 1926D 658 (Ind.).
"83 Re St. Croix Gas Light Co., (1918) P U. R. 1919A 487 (Maine).
1
8 4See Re -Exeter, Hampton, Amesbury St. Ry., (1919) P U. R.
1919B 251 (N.H.).
185Re Van Auken Public Utility Plant, (1924) P U. R. 1925A 460
N.H.); also Re W S. Barnum, (1926) P U. R. 1926B 571 (Oregon).
Owner of a railway operating at a financial loss should be permitted
to discontinue service and dismantle the railway, but should first give
notice to the public, then offer for sale to anyone who may wish to
purchase for purpose of utilizing the same as a railway, for a price
not in excess of that which could be obtained for it if dismantled.
"'6Re Richfield Public Service Co., (1921) P U. R. 1922A 100
(Idaho).18TRe Olive Investment Co., (1924) P U. R. 1924E 557 (Calif.).
18sRe Winona Elec. Light and Water Co., (1920) P U. R. 1920F
968 (Ind.).
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Commissions have declared that it is unnecessary for a util-
ity to attempt certain things before discontinuance. The com-
mission will not deny an abandonment request on the ground that
a utility could make an additional investment by extending its
iine to another community in order to increase its load. 80 The
reason is obvious. It would involve an increased outlay of capi-
tal and be hazardous, at best.
The possibility that a street railway company might in-
crease the volume of its business on a line sought to be abandoned
by diverting the traffic from other routes, was not considered a
sufficient reason for refusing to permit discontinuance. 0 In any
case, notice is essential before discontinuance.'
A difficult problem presents itself where a public utility has
a contract with a municipality requiring continuance and a public
service commission is seeking to allow the company to discon-
tinue. It is obvious that such contracts would not be effective
against the sovereign will of the state. Since there seems to be
no protection for such obligations of municipalities under the
contract clause of the federal constitution,0 2 it would be possible
for the sovereign to absolve utilities from their contracts made
with municipal subdivisions.'0 3 The question then resolves itself
into a proper construction of the statutes and constitution of a
state. If the state constitution protects such contracts, the legis-
lature cannot release the company from performance. If the
municipal contract is not protected by the state constitution and
the legislature can constitutionally relieve the utility fron its
obligation, it is largely a question of interpretation of the statutes
as to which of the state agencies has been granted the autthority
to relieve utilities from the duty to operate. Ordinarily such con-
tracts cannot be asserted against a public service commission hav-
'8ORe Barnes-King Development Co., (1925) P U. R. 1925F: -00
(Mont.).
bORe Beaver Valley Traction Co., (1923) P U. 1j. 1924A 44-1 (I'd.).
lOlEx partc Cen. Ill. Public Service Co., (1916) P U. R. 191613
920 (Ill.), City of Pana v. Ceii. Ill. Pub. Service Co., (1916) r' U R.
1916B 177 (Il1.).
10 2Constitution of the U. S. article I, sec. 10.
193See the article by H. F Kuiiini in 6 liNEso'rA LAW REViiW
140-148. "The grant of franchise rights is a purely governmnctal fuiiction
". "If the state foregoes the nenefits which the municipality has gained
under the contract, it is merely giving up that which has been gained for
it by its agent, the city." Yet see City of Spartanburg, v. S. C. Gas and
Elec. Co., (1924) 130 S. C. 125. 125 S. E. 295. There the court stated, but
did not decide, that the legislature could not give the commission the
power to destroy or impair the obligations of such contracts.
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ing jurisdiction over the utility in question. There are two rea-
sons given for this. The first is that of agency
"Powers possessed by the legislature may be delegated by it
to a munucipality, a commission, or any other creature of the state,
for their exercise in the public interests, powers thus delegated
may in the same manner be withdrawn or modified, and if the
legislative agent has, in pursuance of these powers entered into
agreements with corporations the undoubted weight of au-
thority is that the legislature as the repository of power, may
either directly or through the commission modify the terms
of any such agreements. ,u1'
The second reason involves the police power." 5 The courts have
declared that the state in the exercise of its police power is not
obstructed by the contract of the city with the utility, since the
state cannot alienate any of its sovereign powers necessary to
public health, welfare, morals and safety; and no municipality
either by ordinance or contract can impose upon a public utility
conditions confiscating its property or destroying its power to
serve the public.290 However, a commission is reluctant to re-
lieve a company of its franchise obligations.' 9 7 The Illinois com-
mission has refused to take jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights
of a street railway company under and by virtue of its franchise.i03
Where a company had surrendered its franchise for an indeter-
imnate permit, it was held no longer bound by the obligations of





19'Re Belt Line Ry. Co., (1919) P U. R. 1919D 56 (N.Y.). Also see
Re Bloomington and Normal Ry. and Light Co., (1922) P U. R. 1922E
770 (Ill.).
"'"City of Carthage v. Public Service Commission, (1924) 303 Mo.
505, 260 S. W 973, Portsmouth v. Va. Ry. and Power Co., (1925) 141
Va. 44, 126 S. E. 366; Re Trinidad Electric Transmission Ry. and Gas Co.,
(1922) P U. R. 1922C 299 (Colo.).
196S. W Mo. Ry. v. Pub. Service Commission, (1920) 281 Mo. 52,
219 S. W 380.
"'
t Re Belt Line Ry. Co., (1919) P U. R. 1919D 56; see also Re.
Charleston 'Interurban Ry. Co., (1916) P U. R. 1916 F 338 (W Va.).
"It is the policy of the West Virginia Commission not to interfere with
municipal regulation of utilities whose existence depends upon municipal
franchises, unless the necessity is clear."
19Re St. Louis, Springfield Peoria Ry., (1922) P U. R. 1923B 422
(Ill.).
"99Chlcago, Lake Shore and So. Bend Ry. v. Guilfoyle, (1926) 198
Ind. 9, 152 N. E 167. It was decided that the surrender of its franchuse
by a street railway company under Acts of 1921, p. 197, terminated all
its rights under the franchise and the franchise contract was no longer
binding on the utility in favor of the city or the state.
20ORe Evansville St. Ry. Co., (1918) P U. R. 1918D 685 (Ind.).
